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AN EMPIRICALINVESTIGATION
Abstract: A review of recent literature reflects the development of several deterministic nonparametric
market power tests. We use Monte Carlo experiments to evaluate the veracityof four monopolistic and four
monopsonistic market power tests that use the deterministic nonparametric approach. The experiments are
implemented using datafromtenknownmarket structures. Whenresultsarecompared to Raper, Love, and
Shumway’s (1999) findings concerning parametric market power tests in the Bresnahan-Lau tradition, we
find that the parametric tests perform well while only two of the nonparametric tests appear able to identify
market power.
Keywords: market power, Monte Carlo, nonparametric, monopoly, monopsony.
JEL Classification: L1.1We do not follow the Chicago School which asserts that markups are due to efficiency.
This efficiency lowers costs which translates into lower prices and thus benefits consumers. The
benefits are assumed to be greater than under the situation where less efficient but competitive
firms which do not charge a markup, have higher costs so that prices are in the end higher than
from a more efficient firm.
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1. Introduction
Ineconomic theory, monopolymarket power is the abilityto set price greater thanmarginalcost, that
is, above the competitive level where prices are presumed equal to marginal cost.
1 If market power is
exerted, deadweight welfare loss occurs. This denotes, in the case of monopoly power exertion, that
consumer surplus decreases, producers receive a surplus (profit), and some ofthe former consumer surplus
becomes a loss to society. Knowledge of the degree of market power exertion is used to guide decisions
regarding merger policy or antitrust enforcement in such markets. Thus, it is important to be able to detect
monopolistic or monopsonistic behavior bya firm or industry to assess whether the market structure should
be changed through, for example, government intervention. AnexampleistheUnited States Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration's (GIPSA) recent
investigation into monopsonypower exertion bymeat packers in procuring live cattle. Significant evidence
ofimperfectlycompetitive behavior by packers could lead to new regulations regarding price reporting, the
cattle bidding process, or ultimately to a breakup of the packers by the Justice Department.
Three major approaches to measurement of market power exertion have developed within New
EmpiricalIndustrialOrganization(NEIO):parametric,nonstructural,andnonparametricmarketpowertests.
In this paper, we will focus on deterministic nonparametric market power tests and their performance
comparedtoparametricmarket powertests. Both,parametricanddeterministicnonparametricmarket power
tests develop fromprofit maximization assumptions and result in direct measures of market power exertion.
The parametric approach econometrically estimates market power by parameterizing the monopoly2
(monopsony) markup (markdown) term (Appelbaum 1979; Bresnahan 1982; Lau 1982). It relies on a
calculus approach which assumes that the entire demand and supply function is available for analysis.
Parametric tests yield testable hypotheses regarding market power exertion. However, these hypotheses
depend on the functional form chosen for the underlying model. Additionally, econometric identification of
the market power parameter restricts functional form choice somewhat.
The deterministic nonparametric approach to market power measurement is relatively new and
developed in response to criticisms of the parametric approach (Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987; Driscoll,
Kambhampaty and Purcell 1997; Lambert 1994; Love and Shumway 1994; Ussif and Lambert 1998).
Deterministic nonparametric tests are an exhaustive search for violations of the given hypothesis using an
algebraicapproachassumingonlyafinitenumberofobservationsonfirmbehavior. Incontrast to parametric
tests,deterministicnonparametrictestsdonotrequireadhocspecificationsoffunctionalformforproduction,
cost,profit,supply,ordemandfunctions,so theproblemoftestingjoint hypothesesisavoided(Varian1984;
Varian 1985; Varian 1990). Additionally, less data is required than for parametric tests because opposing
supply or demand curves are not needed and they can handle disaggregated inputs and multiple output
technologies. However, deterministic nonparametric testsare not imbedded in a stochastic framework, that
is, “the data are assumed to be observed without error, so that the tests are ‘all or nothing’: either the data
satisfy the optimization hypothesis or they don’t” (Varian 1985, pg. 445). This can result in the possible
rejection of hypotheses that are only violated once because the magnitude of violations is not considered.
Various authors argue the merits of each type of market power test (Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987;
Hyde and Perloff 1994; Hyde and Perloff 1995), but to date no comprehensive comparison of the
performance of deterministic nonparametric and parametric tests has been conducted. For comparison of
performance, it is necessary to apply the tests to data where the degree ofmarket power exertion is known.3
This is accomplished via Monte Carlo experiments. Love and Shumway (1994), Hyde and Perloff (1994;
1995), and Raper, Love, and Shumway (1996; 1999) use this technique to assess the accuracy of market
power tests. Hyde and Perloff compare the performance of nonstructural tests to the performance of
parametric tests in detecting monopoly or monopsony market power. Love and Shumway explore the
robustness of their deterministic nonparametric monopsony market power test while Raper, Love, and
Shumway (1996) test the accuracy of their statisticalnonparametric market power tests. Raper, Love, and
Shumway (1999) assess the accuracy of traditional NEIO models (Bresnahan-Lau approach) under
misspecification of market structure using a monopoly test, a monopsony test, and a flexible composite
market power test which allows for both monopoly and monopsony market power exertion.
They report mean values and standard deviations of market power parameters for ten market
structures over 1000 simulations for each of the three tests using the same data set as this study. They find
that both the monopoly and monopsony market power tests using the Bresnahan-Lau approach perform
remarkably well at estimating the magnitude of market power exertion. However, when the direction of
market power is misspecified, in the unilateral tests, technology parameter estimates are highly biased. The
compositemodelcombinesthetwo uni-lateralmarket powertestsinto one test that doesnot assumeapriori
one side of the market to be perfectly competitive, but allows for either or both sides of the market to have
some degree of market power. The composite model gives results similar to the monopoly and monopsony
tests when considering the significance of market power estimates. It also performs quite well at estimating
bothdirectionand magnitudeofmarket power exertion. Additionally, Raper, Love, and Shumway’s(1999)
composite model is able to distinguish between perfect competitive and bilateral monopoly data.
Inthisstudy,weassesstheperformanceofdeterministicnonparametricmarketpowertestsviaMonte
Carlo experiments. We first present a brief description of severaldeterministic nonparametric market power4
tests from the literature. Then, we implement these tests using Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1999)
simulated data from 10 different market structures, including perfect competition, monopoly, monopsony,
Cournot and Stackelberg duopoly and duopsony, and three forms of cooperative bilateral monopoly. We
compare the performance ofthese deterministic nonparametric tests to each other and to that ofBresnahan-
Lau type parametric market power tests as reported in Raper, Love, and Shumway (1999). Thus, in this
study, wehopeto addto theknowledgebaseregarding whichtestsshould beused inthefutureto determine
whether a firm and/or industry exerts market power.
2. Deterministic Nonparametric Tests
Deterministic nonparametric tests, which employ a revealed preference approach, were introduced
by Afriat (1972), Hanoch and Rothschild (1972), Diewert and Parkan (1983), and Varian (1984) in the
production economics literature. Varian (1984) proposed the Monopolistic Axiom of Profit Maximization
(MAPM) which gives the conditions under which observed behavior can be rationalized as monopolistic
behavior. Ashenfelter and Sullivan (Ashenfelter and Sullivan 1987) developed the first deterministic
nonparametricmonopolymarketpowertest basedontheWeakAxiomofProfit Maximization(WAPM)that
directly measures the importance of the monopoly markup term in profit maximization.. Others followed in
developing market power testswithfoundationsinthisliterature(Driscoll, Kambhampatyand Purcell1997;
Lambert 1994; Love and Shumway 1994; Ussif and Lambert 1998). The general approach measures the
importance of the monopoly markup or monopsony markdown term in profit maximization. In the case of
monopsonypower, market power translates to aninput pricelessthanthevalueofmarginalproduct. In the
case of monopoly power, market power translates to an output price higher than the marginal cost of
production. For consistency with competitive behavior, WAPM states that the observed input and output5
∆πi ' p∆yi % y i∆p & j
n
m'1
w m∆zmi # 0, (3)
quantity choices at output price p and the vector ofinput prices, w, must yield profit at least as great as any
other quantityset that could have been chosen. Quantitychoices made ineachperiod willprovide evidence
of market power.
Consider firm i’s profit maximization problem
Max
yi
πi ' pyi & j
n
m'1
wmzmi subject to Fi(z) $ yi , (1)
where p is output price, yi is firm i’s output, wm is the price of input m, zmi is the quantity of input m
demanded byfirmi, zisthevector ofvariable inputs, and Fi(z)i sf i r mi’sproductionfunction. Theperfectly
competitive firm’s discrete first-order profit-maximizing condition is
∆πi ' p∆yi & j
n
m'1
wm∆zmi # 0. (2)
ThisistheWAPM. Hereweassumethat pricesareexogenoussincethefirmcannot influencepricesthrough
input or output quantitychoice. However, a firm with monopoly power in the output market can influence
output price p by its choice of output level yi. Thus, the monopolistic firm’s first-order profit-maximizing
condition in discrete terms is
wheretheoutput pricep isnowdependent onfirmi’soutput quantitydecision. Themonopolymarkup term
isthesecondtermontheright-hand-side. Byreducing output ofyi, thefirmcanincreasethepriceit receives
for every unit sold. Equation (3) represents a modification of WAPM to allow for monopolistic market
power. A similar equation can be derived for the monopsony case.6
∆πi ' p∆yi & j
n&1
m'1
wm∆zmi & wn∆zni & zni∆w n # 0, (4)
where the monopsony markdown term is the fourth term on the right hand side. By reducing the quantity
bought of the monopsonistically exerted input zni bought, the firm can decrease the price, wn, it has to pay
for this input.
2.1 Ashenfelter and Sullivan Method
Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) were the first to test for monopolymarket power exertion using the
deterministic nonparametric approach. They construct a deterministic nonparametric test of the monopoly
modelbasedonrevealedpreferenceargumentsandextendthetest to assessthevalidityofsome lessextreme
oligopoly models. They make two assumptions that simplify the empirical implementation: (1) the
assumption of increasing costs and (2) the maintained hypothesis that variations in the excise tax are
equivalent to changes in marginal cost. This allows Ashenfelter and Sullivan to drop input costs from the
equation since their exclusion will not affect the equation’s integrity. The monopoly markup term is
parameterized and itsparameter, ,liesbetweenzero forperfect competitionand onefor monopolywhile βmp
valuesinbetweencorrespond to oligopolysituations. Theparameter isthusanequivalent to theLerner βmp
index (1934) of monopoly market power, , which exhibits these properties under the L ' P & MC
P
assumptionthat a monopolist doesnot operate inthe inelastic portionofthe demand curve. Ashenfelter and
Sullivan adjust also for structural shifts (shifts in the demand or cost functions) by comparing only
observations no more than two years apart, but do not incorporate the possibility of technical change. The
original industry-level monopolymarket power test is7
β




s œ t … sw h e r e *t & s*#2, (5)
where t and s represent time periods, with t = 1, 2, ..., T and e
s is the excise tax. Applying this model to the
U.S.cigaretteindustryfrom1955to1982bystate,theyfindlittleevidenceforthemonopolyhypothesis(true
only 37% of the time). Additionally, they calculate a Cournot numbers equivalent (CNE) which is greater
or equal to the inverse of . More than 75% of the data support the hypothesis that the U.S. cigarette βmp
industrybehaves equivalent to having five or sixCournot-typefirms in the market. More than 86.5% ofthe
data support the hypothesis that the industry works as if nine Cournot-firms compete in the same market.
To generalize this test to industries that do not exhibit excise taxes, the test can be modified to
β




s œ t … sw h e r e *t & s*#2. (6)
Using the same method as Ashenfelter and Sullivan, we can also develop an analagous test for
monopsony market power exertion, given by
β




s œ t … sw h e r e *t & s*#2, (7)
where isequalto aLerner-typeindexfor monopsonymarket powerexertion, ,which βms M '
VMP & wn
wn
has a lower bound of zero. VMP represents the value of the marginal product.
Raper, Love, and Shumway (1998) revise Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test to explicitly include input
parameters to account for possible changes in costs. Additionally, they use Love and Shumway’s (1994)
method to account for obvious structural shifts in the opposing market. For the measurement ofmonopoly8
market power, we are concerned with shifts in the demand curve from the opposing market. Such shifts
unmatched by supply shifts occur where the change in output prices, i.e., where is of the same sign as ∆p
the change in output quantity, . The resulting monopoly market power test is ∆yi
βmp #
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They also develop the analagous monopsonymarket power test using the same revisions. Here, we
are concerned with shifts in the supplycurve from the opposing market, represented by the situation where
thechangeinthe priceofthepotentiallymonopsonisticallyexerted input, , isnot thesameasthechange ∆wn









































2.2 Love and Shumway Approach
Love and Shumway (1994) develop a deterministic nonparametric monopsony market power test
using a linear programming technique. The test is grounded in the revealed preference approach of
Ashenfelter andSullivan, but includes the possibilityofHicks-neutral(additiveoutput-augmenting) technical
change and adjusts for structural change as discussed above. “Technical change is said to be Hicks neutral
ifthe marginalrate ofsubstitution between inputs is not affected bythe change” (Chavasand Cox1990, pg.
450). Its introduction into deterministic nonparametric tests has been pioneered byChavas and Cox (1990;
1992; 1995) and Cox and Chavas (1990). Love and Shumway are the first to employ the method in a9
nonparametric market power test. The test maybe implemented using firm-level data or industry-level data.
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and is representative of the price flexibility of the opposing supply curve. It is thus a Lerner-type index of
monopsonymarket power exertionwithalowerboundofzero. LoveandShumwayexaminefor thevalidity
of their test by simulating a firm-level Monte Carlo data set for four different market structures (perfect
competition, Stackelberg duopsony, Cournot duopsony, and monopsony). They find that the test’s results
are consistent with the assumptions regarding market structure. However, they note that the choice of
criterion function weights results in differing market power estimates.
Raper, Love, and Shumway (1998) adapt the model to test for monopoly market power exertion.
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where is the monopoly market power parameter and represents the price flexibility of demand, also mp
ts
i
known as the Lerner index.
3. Data and Implementation
The Monte Carlo data set implemented in this paper was developed by Raper, Love, and Shumway
(1999). Itcontainsdataforeachoftendifferent market structures: monopsony(MS),Stackelbergduopsony
(SS), Cournot duopsony(CS),perfect competition(PC),Cournot duopoly(CP), Stackelberg duopoly(SP),
monopoly (MP), and three forms of cooperative bilateral monopoly (buyer dominates (BMU), seller
dominates (BML), and equal profit split (BM)). They chose the normalized quadratic functional form for
thecost functions, assumingtwocompetitivevariableinputsforupstreammarketsandarestrictednormalized
quadratic cost functionindownstreammarkets withone competitive variable input andoneconditionalinput
inthemarketwithpotentialmonopsonypower. Returnsto scaleareslightlydecreasingfortheupstreamfirm
while the downstream firm’s technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. The industry-level data are
generatedfor68periodswithexogenousvariablesheldconstant acrossalternativesimulations. Induopsony
cases, firm-level data is simulated and then aggregated to industry level. One thousand experiments are11
conducted for eachmarket structure. More specific details regarding the simulation maybe found inRaper,
Love, and Shumway (1999).
Weusethisdataset toimplement thepreviouslydiscusseddeterministicnonparametric market power
tests. Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s monopolytest (equation6), our monopsonymodificationthereof(equation
7), and Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) revisions for both monopoly (equation 8) and monopsony
(equation 9) are calculated in SAS. Love and Shumway’s monopsony test (equation 10) and Raper, Love,
and Shumway’s (1998) analogous monopoly test (equation 11) require linear programming and are
implemented using GAMS and the solver MINOS.
4. Results
In this section, we present the results of the Monte Carlo experiments for the deterministic
nonparametricmarketpowertestsdiscussedabove. Themeanmarketpowervalueiscalculatedoverall1000
(N) experiments for each market structure. The Love and Shumway type tests yield some infeasible
outcomes(I)whichwedeletebeforecalculatingthemeanmarket powervalue. Additionally,to avoidbiased
means, we delete probable outliers (O) as defined for a modified Boxplot. We report the number of feasible
outcomes (N-I) as well as the number of observations after deletion of probable outliers (N-I-O). The
reported average market power values are then calculated over the latter number ofobservations. We also
report the standard error for each mean market power parameter and the probability with which the
hypothesis that this parameter is equal to zero is rejected.12
4.1 Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s Method
In Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s monopoly market power test, comparisons of data more than two
periods apart are excluded from the calculation of the market power parameter, identifying these pairwise
comparisons as structuralshifts; thus, 4290 pairwise comparisons are omitted in each simulation. Negative
valuesofthemarket powerparameterareconsideredtobeviolationsofprofitmaximizationandthusarealso
excluded. Theoretically, the monopoly market power parameter ( ) should lie between zero and one, βmp
which is not the case for the mean values of calculated market power parameters for any of the ten market
structures. Allresults lie outside ofthese bounds (Table 1). For example, = 6.8812 for monopolydata βmp
and 4.0037 for perfect competition data. The latter should theoretically be equal to zero. Ashenfelter and
Sullivan’s Cournot Numbers Equivalent (CNE), a measure of the least number of firms with Cournot
behavior that theindustrycould support, iscalculatedas . Table1revealsthat for themonopolymarket 1
βmp
structure, 92.5 % ofthe data support the hypothesis that the industrybehaves equivalent to having less than
or equalto four firms in the industry(CNE4). The cumulative percentage ofthe data where the CNE is less
than or equal to one, two, three, etc. should increase more rapidly with high levels of monopoly market
powerexertion. Fordatarepresentingmarketstructureswherelowornomarket powerexertionisexpected,
the size of the CNE should increase more slowly. This is not the case for Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s
monopoly test. For example, 93% of the perfectly competitive data support the assumption that the
industry’s behavior is equivalent to that of four Cournot firms. This result is comparable to the monopoly
result and thus inconsistent with the data.
TheLerner-typemonopsonymarketpowerindexforourmonopsonymodificationofAshenfelterand
Sullivan’s original test has a lower bound of zero. Thus, the results from our implementation of the test are
consistent withtheoryin this respect (Table 2). For example, =1.8355 for monopsonydataand 6.8170 βms13
for perfect competition data. Note that for perfect competition should equal zero. Only 56 % of the βms
monopsony market structure data actually support a CNE of four firms, while 90 % of the monopoly and
86% of the perfect competition market structure data support a monopsonistic CNE of four firms. The
monopolyand monopsony results should be switched to lend support to the hypotheses behind the test and
theperfect competitionresultsshouldbe lower thanthe monopsonyresults. Thus, Ashenfelter andSullivan’s
test representsanimportant stepfordeterministicnonparametricmarket power tests, but our studysupports
Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s call for potential improvements. It is possible that information inadequately
accounted for, such as measurement errors, technological change, structural change, or input costs might
seriously bias the estimates. Additionally, the exclusion of all negative market power parameters from the
calculation of the CNE’s because they are assumed to be violations of profit maximization might be over-
restrictive. Admitting a reasonable tolerance levelfor smallviolations mayimprove results. The assumption
that the monopoly market power test can be generalized to industries without data on excise tax or a similar
movement in marginal cost might also be misleading.
ResultsforRaper,Love,andShumway’s(1998)revisionofAshenfelterandSullivan’stest measuring
monopolymarket power exertionarereported inTable 3. Recallthat Raper, Love, and Shumwayexplicitly
include input cost and omit obvious structural demand shifts. The mean of the monopoly market power
parameter for each market structure are indeed different from those obtained from implementation of the
originaltest. However, nowonly79%ofthedatasupport aCNE4forthemonopolymarket structure, while
96% of Cournot duopoly data and 94% of Stackelberg duopoly data support a CNE4. Additionally, the
CNE4 for perfect competition data increased to more than 95%.
Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) analagous monopsonymarket power test produces somewhat
more plausible results (Table 4). Again, input costs are explicitly included and obvious structural shifts in2We realize that the choice of the weights could slightly impact the outcome of the
measures, but for simplicity in comparing to other tests, we have chosen to use one as a base
value.
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supplyareomitted. Formonopsonydata,96%oftheobservationssupport amonopsonisticCNE4. Further,
87% ofCournot duopsonyand 84% ofStackelberg duopsonydata support aCNE4. However, for allother
simulated market structures, between 76% and 82% of the data support the assumption of CNE4 in the
market, making it difficult to distinguish between market structures. Thus, Raper, Love, and Shumway’s
revision of Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s test for either monopoly or monopsony market power exertion does
not substantially improve estimates of the degree of market power nor confidence in the results.
4.2 Love and Shumway’s Method
We implement Love and Shumway’s monopsony test and Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998)
monopolymodificationthereofusing thevalueoneasweightsfor bothtechnicalchangeparameters, and b t%
, and for the criterion function parameter, c.
2 For LoveandShumway’smonopsonymarket power test, b t&
the mean of the market power parameter, , is significantly different from zero (p = 0.0001) for each ¯ ms ts
market structure (Table 5). Theoretically, only the market power parameters for monopsony, Cournot
duopsony, and Stackelberg duopsonymarket structures should bedifferent fromzero. However, thevalues
for perfect competition and the bilateral monopolies are economically small with values between 0.005 and
0.1. The mean market power parameter for the monopsony market structure is 1.9022. This implies that
the industry pays 190.22% less for the monopsonistically exerted input than the last input unit’s internal
marginal value. With simulated data, we have the luxury of knowing the true values of for each ¯ ms ts
structure and, thus, can test whether our estimates are statistically different fromtheir true values. The null
hypotheses that the monopsony market power parameter, , of 1.9022 is equalto the true value of2.06 ¯ ms ts15
for thesimulated monopsonydata, theCournot of0.3390 isequalto itstruevalueof0.78, and that the ¯ ms ts
Stackelberg of0.2462 isequalto itstruevalueof0.46areallrejectedwithp=0. Thus,themonopsony ¯ ms ts
market power test performs well in detecting the presence of monopsony market power, though less so at
distinguishing between magnitudes when market power exertion is not as extreme. However, in our
experiments the test also detects some monopsony market power when oligopolistic data are used.
Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) modification of Love and Shumway’s test which tests for
monopoly market power does not perform quite as well (Table 6). Again, mean market power parameters
for all market structures are significantly different from zero (p = 0.0001). For perfect competition, ¯ mp ts
=0.028. Thismeasureissignificantlydifferent fromitstruevalueofzero, but iseconomicallyverysmalland
thus not necessarily an indicator of invalidity of the test. For monopoly ( = 0.159), Cournot duopoly ¯ mp ts
( = 0.3143), and Stackelberg duopoly data ( = 0.3405), the market power parameters are also ¯ mp ts ¯ mp ts
significantlydifferentfromtheirtruemarketpowervaluesof1.0,0.5,and0.4046(p=0),respectively. A ¯ mp ts
value of 0.4046 means that 40.46% of the output price received by the firm is monopoly markup over
marginal cost of the last unit produced. The values for Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg duopoly are
relatively large, indicating economically significant market power exertion. However, the market power
estimate for monopolydata is relativelysmallascompared to the duopolycases, while for monopsony ¯ mp ts
isverylargeat6.4611andactuallyoutofthetheoreticalbounds. Theoreticallyitshouldbenearzero,while ¯ mp ts
for monopoly should be near 1.0. Monopsony, Cournot duopoly, and Stackelberg duopoly data all result
in maximum market power values of a much greater magnitude than the other market structures. Hence,
Raper,Love,andShumway’smonopolymarketpowertestdoesappeartobeabletodetectmonopolymarket
power exertion, though it exhibits problems in accuratelydetecting magnitude in our experiments. Further,16
themarket structurespecificationofthemodelisagainveryimportant asthetest detectssomemarket power
when market power is instead being exerted from the opposite party in the market.
Overall, our experiments suggest that Love and Shumway’s approach and Raper, Love, and
Shumway’s analogous monopoly test work reasonably well in identifying market power when the direction
of market power is correctly specified. However, the test appears to attribute market power in the absence
ofsuch when market power isactuallybeing exerted bytheopposite partyin the market, i.e. the test detects
monopsony power when monopoly power is instead being exerted and vice versa. This emphasizes the
importance of correctly specifying the direction ofmarket power exertion. On the surface, this may appear
to be a simple task. However, in certain cases conditions exist for both parties of market transactions that
cloudtheissueofwho mayholdmarket power. Forexample,manysellersorganizedasacooperativeto gain
bargaining power may face concentrated buyers. In such cases, Love and Shumway’s test may give an
incorrect assessment of market power exertion.
6. Conclusions
Knowledge of the degree of market power exertion is important in guiding antitrust and merger
policies. This study performs a comprehensive analysis of the relatively new approach of deterministic
nonparametric market power tests. Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s (1987) test for monopolymarket power and
itscounterpartformonopsonymarketpowerdevelopedinthispaper,aswellasrevisionsofthetestproposed
by Raper, Love, and Shumway (1998), are implemented. Additionally, Love and Shumway’s (1994)
monopsony test and Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) monopoly counterpart, are implemented using




Ashenfelter and Sullivan make a major contribution to the field by introducing the first deterministic
nonparametric market power test. However, as they point out, their market power test might benefit from
modifications. This result is confirmed by this study. The results are not satisfactory for the original
Ashenfelter and Sullivan monopoly market power test, the analogous monopsony market power test, or
Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) revisions to Ashenfelter and Sullivan for monopoly and monopsony
market power. This suggests that researchers should be hesitant about choosing Ashenfelter and Sullivan
type tests to measure the degree of market power exertion in an industry.
Love and Shumway’s approach extends Ashenfelter and Sullivan’s approach by incorporating
technicalchangevariables and an alternative method ofdealing with structuralshifts. Loveand Shumway’s
monopsony market power test yields estimates close to the true market power value on the downstream
firm’s side. However, to some extent the test incorrectlyattributes upstreammarket power to downstream
firms. This implies that Love and Shumway’s monopsony market power test can be implemented under the
restrictionthat the modelisspecified for the ‘right’ direction. The monopolymarket power test inLove and
Shumway’s tradition performs less accuratelyand should be implemented under the same restrictions. This
indicates that ifthere is any potential for market power from the opposing side ofthe market, biased results
may be obtained unless proper modifications are made.
All three parametric market power tests perform very well in Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1999)
study. The composite model incorporates the monopolyand monopsonymarket power tests into one test
and performs equally as well as the unilateralmonopolyand monopsonymarket power tests at determining
market power magnitude, when unilateral market power is present. Further, it has the advantage of18
incorporatingbilateralmarket power, thusavoidingtheaprioriassumptionofperfectlycompetitivebehavior
by one party in the transaction. This suggests that the composite model should be implemented when
choosing to perform a parametric market power test. Hyde and Perloff (1994; 1995) came to a similar
conclusion finding that even with increasing measurement error, the parametric monopsony and monopoly
market power tests find the correct market structure in virtually all of the cases. However, they also point
out that parametric market power tests may be biased when the functional form is misspecified.
Thequestionremainsasto whichapproachispreferredfor empiricalmeasurement ofmarket power.
Our comparison suggests that unilateral parametric tests are more robust than unilateral deterministic
nonparametric teststo misspecificationbiaswithrespect to the directionofmarket power inthat theydo not
incorrectly attribute market power where it does not exist. However, our analysis does suggest that Love
andShumway’sunilateralnonparametricmonopsonypowertestandRaper,Love,andShumway’smonopoly
counterpart do distinguish between perfect competition and imperfect competition when market power
directioniscorrectlyspecified. Onlyforthesetwodeterministicnonparametricmethodsdo weobtainresults
sufficientlyclose to the true value of market power exertion in the market to recommend them for use with
real data. Thus, we recommend these two deterministic market power tests as preliminary tests to specify
whether the data exhibits an economically significant amount of market power exertion. The tests may be
particularly useful in this respect since they are easily implemented and only need a small amount of data.
Consequently, if market power exertion has been found using Love and Shumway type tests, it may be
worthwhile to collect more data to implement parametric market power tests such as the composite
parametric model in Raper, Love, and Shumway (1999).Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
mp
4.0037 6.8812 3.1620 3.0134 1.0248 2.7852 3.1692 5.3144 3.7003 4.8022
Standard Error 0.0662 0.1352 0.0730 0.0668 0.0156 0.0443 0.0538 0.0970 0.0899 0.0869
Prob > |T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
CNE # 1 63.70 69.90 41.34 41.84 18.47 47.79 53.43 56.05 41.09 61.12
CNE # 2 83.56 84.66 61.46 62.90 39.91 71.53 75.83 72.81 57.84 78.71
CNE # 3 89.85 89.92 71.92 73.54 52.53 81.49 84.45 80.89 68.16 85.74
CNE # 4 92.68 92.49 77.99 79.59 60.74 86.50 88.75 85.48 74.78 89.25
CNE # 5 94.20 94.03 81.97 83.29 66.70 89.54 91.20 88.30 79.14 91.43
CNE # 6 95.24 94.99 84.62 85.81 71.21 91.49 92.80 90.21 82.25 92.84
CNE # 7 95.95 95.68 86.70 87.73 74.81 92.81 93.89 91.52 84.52 93.80
CNE # 8 96.53 96.22 88.25 89.20 77.73 93.79 94.72 92.61 86.40 94.58
CNE # 9 96.96 96.64 89.46 90.36 80.06 94.53 95.35 93.35 87.87 95.21
CNE #4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N-I-O
c 898 907 858 862 911 916 900 778 787 855
N-I
d 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 1. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters and Cumulative Cournot Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for Original
Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopoly Market Power Test (1000 Experiments)Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
ms
6.8170 8.5815 1.9837 1.9113 1.8355 4.3288 4.9850 5.3182 2.9998 5.8255
Standard Error 0.1692 0.1876 0.0358 0.0344 0.0434 0.0925 0.1138 0.1027 0.0553 0.1288
Prob > T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
CNE # 1 58.07 66.43 32.27 31.94 25.75 46.81 49.99 56.82 45.78 55.63
CNE # 2 74.15 81.21 67.91 69.75 40.22 64.22 67.43 73.29 65.55 73.92
CNE # 3 81.48 87.04 81.48 82.96 49.70 73.31 76.08 81.23 74.66 81.82
CNE # 4 85.50 90.15 87.01 88.23 56.18 78.70 81.24 85.68 80.27 86.17
CNE # 5 88.18 92.07 89.93 90.94 61.07 82.28 84.52 88.42 84.04 88.75
CNE # 6 89.98 93.32 91.78 92.65 64.93 84.85 86.82 90.31 86.67 90.55
CNE # 7 91.34 94.29 93.01 93.77 68.00 86.83 88.46 91.62 88.58 91.88
CNE # 8 92.37 95.00 93.94 94.59 70.55 88.33 89.85 92.60 90.00 92.89
CNE # 9 93.19 95.52 94.63 95.23 72.79 89.55 90.85 93.40 91.09 93.69
CNE #4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N-I-O
c 892 897 865 866 904 913 911 778 786 857
N-I
d 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 2. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters and Cumulative Cournot Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for
Modification of Ashenfelter and Sullivan to Monopsony Market Power Test (1000 Experiments)Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CPI SPI MS CSI SSI BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
mp
4.7248 11.4490 5.1217 4.1825 1.4661 7.1698 6.7928 5.6359 3.6457 24.7017
Standard Error 0.0476 0.1169 0.0473 0.0371 0.0153 0.0723 0.0753 0.0445 0.0444 0.2273
Prob > |T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
CNE # 1 71.10 58.01 71.68 68.57 20.07 64.04 64.43 78.26 43.20 86.97
CNE # 2 88.97 66.99 87.71 85.16 38.38 82.74 83.19 94.32 86.29 91.55
CNE # 3 92.92 73.44 92.99 90.81 48.46 88.77 89.18 97.73 94.47 93.50
CNE # 4 94.61 79.03 95.60 93.85 55.86 91.64 92.03 98.57 97.01 94.68
CNE # 5 95.56 83.56 96.97 95.76 61.96 93.30 93.68 98.89 98.36 95.49
CNE # 6 96.18 86.98 97.73 96.91 67.00 94.40 94.75 99.08 98.91 96.10
CNE # 7 96.63 89.48 98.19 97.60 71.06 95.19 95.51 99.20 99.18 96.57
CNE # 8 96.97 91.41 98.50 98.05 74.34 95.77 96.07 99.28 99.34 96.93
CNE # 9 97.24 92.87 98.71 98.36 77.03 96.22 96.51 99.35 99.44 97.24
CNE #4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Shifts 2242 3157 3029 2880 689 1729 1951 3051 2966 3869
N-I-O
c 976 996 999 998 990 998 993 994 986 998
N-I
d 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 3. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters and Cumulative Cournot Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for Raper,
Love, and Shumway’s (1998) Revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopoly Market Power Test (1000 Experiments)Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
ms
3.8843 4.7004 2.0597 2.0240 15.7593 9.0864 7.2917 2.7983 2.4439 3.3455
Standard Error 0.0848 0.0943 0.0296 0.0287 0.2121 0.1556 0.1275 0.0519 0.0384 0.0840
Prob > |T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
CNE # 1 46.48 49.59 37.08 39.27 83.81 62.63 57.51 47.20 39.88 40.98
CNE # 2 62.87 64.78 62.65 65.09 91.59 76.72 72.59 68.27 61.69 50.14
CNE # 3 71.14 72.21 73.04 74.90 94.26 82.91 79.78 77.34 71.32 58.74
CNE # 4 76.10 77.10 78.40 80.04 95.61 86.48 83.93 82.15 76.40 64.99
CNE # 5 79.57 80.24 81.96 83.26 96.43 88.85 86.64 85.24 79.52 69.79
CNE # 6 82.09 82.74 84.44 85.51 97.01 90.48 88.54 87.33 81.70 73.33
CNE # 7 84.14 84.68 86.25 87.19 97.42 91.71 90.00 88.75 83.44 76.04
CNE # 8 85.63 86.15 87.69 88.57 97.74 92.68 91.12 89.85 84.79 78.25
CNE # 9 86.92 87.39 88.86 89.66 97.99 93.43 92.02 90.71 85.97 80.15
CNE #4 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Shifts 2308 1395 1523 1674 3844 2822 2601 1503 1588 680
N-I-O
c 949 964 961 963 986 970 973 977 977 951
N-I
d 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 4. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters and Cumulative Cournot Numbers Equivalents (CNE) for Raper,
Love, and Shumway’s (1998) Revised Ashenfelter and Sullivan Monopsony Market Power Test (1000 Experiments)23
Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
ms
0.0990 0.0780 0.1203 0.1603 1.9022 0.3390 0.2462 0.0212 0.0604 0.0045
Standard Error 0.0013 0.0009 0.0010 0.0016 0.0241 0.0047 0.0032 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Prob > |T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Shifts 2312 1395 1524 1673 3867 2829 2605 1505 1589 681
N-I-O
c 944 954 954 944 946 953 933 959 966 954
N-I
d 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer
Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 5. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters for Original Love and Shumway Monopsony Test (1000
Experiments)Simulated Market Structure
a
PC MP CP SP MS CS SS BM BML BMU
b ¯ β
mp
0.0280 0.1590 0.3143 0.3405 6.4611 0.1229 0.0883 0.0127 0.0076 0.0555
Standard Error 0.0003 0.0027 0.0058 0.0063 0.1165 0.0010 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 0.0008
Prob > |T| 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
Shifts 2242 3161 3032 2883 689 1728 1951 3051 2967 3874
N-I-O
c 979 933 937 935 899 975 973 992 990 982
N-I
d 999 982 975 988 977 995 996 994 999 993
aPC=Perfect Competition, MP=Monopoly, CP=Cournot Duopoly, SP=Stackelberg Duopoly, MS=Monopsony, CS=Cournot Duopsony,
SS= Stackelberg Duopsony, BM=Bilateral Monopoly (Equal Profit Split), BML=BM (Seller Dominates), BMU=BM (Buyer Dominates).
bMean value based on N-I-O experiments.
cN-I-O = Number of observations after deletion of infeasible outcomes and probable outliers.
dN–I = Number of feasible outcomes.
Table 6. Mean Value of Estimated Market Power Parameters for Raper, Love, and Shumway’s (1998) Modification of Love and
Shumway to Monopoly Test (1000 Experiments)25
References
Afriat, Sydney N. 1972. “EfficiencyEstimationofProductionFunctions.” International Economic Review
13:568-598.
Appelbaum, Elie. 1979. “Testing Price Taking Behavior.” Journal of Econometrics 9:283-294.
Ashenfelter, Orley, and Daniel Sullivan. 1987. “Nonparametric Tests of Market Structure: An Application
to the Cigarette Industry.” Journal of Industrial Economics 35:483-498.
Bresnahan, TimothyF. 1982. “The OligopolySolution Concept is Identified.”EconomicsLetters10:87-92.
Chavas, Jean-Paul, and Thomas L. Cox. 1990. “A Non-Parametric Analysis of Productivity: The Case of
U.S. and Japanese Manufacturing.” American Economic Review 80:450-464.
Chavas, Jean-Paul, and Thomas L. Cox. 1992. “A Nonparametric Analysis of the Influence of Research on
Agricultural Productivity.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74:583-591.
Chavas, Jean-Paul, and Thomas L. Cox. 1995. “On Nonparametric Supply Response Analysis.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 77:80-92.
Cox,ThomasL.,andJean-PaulChavas.1990.“ANonparametricAnalysisofProductivity:TheCaseofU.S.
Agriculture.” European Review of Agricultural Economics 17:449-464.
Diewert, W. Erwin, and Celik Parkan. 1983. “Linear Programming Tests of Regularity Conditions for
ProductionFunctions.”Pp. 131-158inQuantitativeStudiesonProductionandPrices,editedbyW.
Eichhorn, R. Henn, K. Neumann, and R.W. Shephard. Würzburg - Wien: Physica-Verlag.
Driscoll, Paul J., S. Murthy Kambhampaty, and Wayne D. Purcell. 1997. “Nonparametric Tests of Profit
Maximization in Oligopoly with Application to the Beef Packing Industry.” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 79:872-879.
Hanoch, Giora, and Michael Rothschild. 1972. “Testing the Assumptions of Production Theory: A
Nonparametric Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 80:256-275.
Hyde, Charles E., and JeffreyM. Perloff. 1994. “CanMonopsonyPowerbeEstimated?” American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 76:1151-1155.
Hyde, Charles E., and Jeffrey M. Perloff. 1995. “Can Market Power be Estimated?” Review of Industrial
Organization 10:465-485.26
Lambert, David K. 1994. “TechnologicalChange in Meat and Poultry-Packing and Processing.” Journal of
Agricultural and Applied Economics 26:591-604.
Lau, Lawrence J. 1982. “On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output
Data.” Economics Letters 10:93-99.
Lerner, Abba P. 1934. “The Concept of Monopolyand the Measurement ofMonopolyPower.” Reviewof
Economic Studies 1:157-175.
Love, H. Alan, and C. Richard Shumway. 1994. “Nonparametric Tests for Monopsonistic Market Power
Exertion.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76:1156-1162.
Raper, Kellie Curry, H. Alan Love, and C. Richard Shumway. 1996. “A Nonparametric Statistical Test for
Monopsony Market Power Exertion.” Selected Paper Presented at the American Agricultural
Economics Association Annual Meeting, San Antonio, Texas. Abstract published in American
Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78 (December 1996):1411.
Raper, Kellie C., H. Alan Love, and C. Richard Shumway. 1998. “Distinguishing the Source of Market
Power: An Application to Cigarette Manufacturing.” Faculty Paper 98-18 , Department of
Agricultural Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas.
Raper, Kellie Curry, H. Alan Love, and C. Richard Shumway. Forthcoming. “Determining Market Power
Exertion between Buyers and Sellers.” Journal of Applied Econometrics.
Ussif, Al-Amin, and David K. Lambert. 1998. “Testing for Noncompetitive Behavior in the U.S. Food
Industry.” Selected Paper Presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual
Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah, August 2-5, 1998.
Varian, Hal R. 1984. “The Nonparametric Approach to Production Analysis.” Econometrica 52:579-597.
Varian, HalR. 1985. “Non-Parametric Analysis of Optimizing Behavior with Measurement Error.” Journal
of Econometrics 30:445 - 458.
Varian, Hal R. 1990. “Goodness-of-Fit in Optimizing Models.” Journal of Econometrics 46:125-140.